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Prices
ABSTRACT

Rising insulin prices entail rising economic and social costs that are
shouldered by all Americans. While three insulin manufacturers cling to
their control of the insulin market, consumers are unable to exercise
meaningful choices between competitors to drive prices down. When
market forces fail, the solution is federal regulation of the insulin
market. The failure of typical forces like competition in this market
necessitatesfederal regulation to curb the monopolisticpowers of insulin
manufacturers. This Comment explores the history and importance of
insulin and the current ramifications of exorbitant insulin prices. This
Comment then examines different categories of economic regulation and
scrutinizes legislation that state governments have begun enacting to
regulate insulin prices. Ultimately, this Comment argues that the federal
government should implement a combination of price cap regulation and
nationalization of insulin formula patents to increase competition and
decrease insulinprices, thereby reducing the economic and social burdens
borne by Americans.
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INTRODUCTION

Today, a single vial of insulin can cost more than $250 in the United
States, and most patients use between two and four vials each month.'
Consequently, if a diabetic patient is without insurance, or if insurance does
not cover a specific brand of insulin, that person could pay upwards of $500
2
to $1,000 per month out-of-pocket for an essential medication. These costs
are astronomical and unacceptable-the federal government must step in to
regulate pricing.
On January 11, 1922, fourteen-year-old Leonard Thompson faced the
end stages of a terminal illness: diabetes mellitus, otherwise known as type
1 diabetes.3 Thompson weighed only sixty-five pounds after living with
diabetes for three years.' His attempt to control his diabetes with a

1. Bram Sable-Smith, Insulin's High Cost Leads To Lethal Rationing, NPR (Sept. 1,
2018), https://perma.cc/8PQV-6XAB.
2. See id.
3. Howard Markel, How a Boy Became the First to Beat Back Diabetes, PBS NEWS
HoUR (Jan. 11, 2013), https://perma.cc/LQ92-RZN5.
4. Id.
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starvation diet failed to keep him from slipping in and out of a diabetic
coma.5 Desperate for any chance to save his son, Thompson's father agreed
to let the hospital inject the boy with a recently-discovered drug-insulin.6
Thompson would be the first human subject to receive the injection,' and
the results were nothing short of miraculous.' His blood sugar lowered to a
normal level, and the glucose and ketones' present in his urine also lowered
to a tolerable level.10
Four men discovered this "wonder drug"": Frederick Banting, Charles
Best, James Collip, and John Macleod.1 2 Following Banting's and Best's
initial publication of their results, 13 the discovery of insulin and its
successful application to human subjects landed on the covers of
newspapers worldwide.14 Insulin provided life-saving treatment for people
who previously faced a death sentence; the drug brought diabetic patients
out of comas, allowing them to end their starvation diets and eat
carbohydrates." For their discovery, Banting and Macleod won the 1923
Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine and split their winnings with Best
and Collip.16

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Ketones are chemicals that a person's body produces when it processes fat as energy,
typically due to a lack of insulin, which would normally convert glucose into energy. See
Kyla Schmieg, Ketones-The 6 Must-Knows, BEYOND TYPE 1, https://perma.cc/2TJVCKTR. A build-up of ketones in the bloodstream can lead to diabetic ketoacidosis, a serious
condition that can result in coma or death if left untreated. Id.
10. Ignazio Vecchio, Cristina Tomali, Nicola Luigi Bragazzi, Mariano Martini, The
Discovery of Insulin: An Important Milestone in the History of Medicine, FRONTIERS IN
ENDOCRINOLOGY, Oct. 2018, at 4, https://perma.cc/XU7H-K9JS.
11. Markel, supranote 3.
12. See id.; see also FrederickBanting, CharlesBest, James Collip, and John Macleod,
Sci. HIST. INST., https://perma.cc/286C-MESE [hereinafter FrederickBanting].Banting was
a surgeon from Ontario, Best was an eager medical student at the University of Toronto,
Collip was a biochemist who made the breakthrough in purifying the insulin, and Macleod
was a University of Toronto physiologist who provided the lab space and dogs on which the
group initially tested the insulin. Id.
13. Banting and Best published their findings in the JournalofLaboratoryand Clinical
Medicine in February 1922. Markel, supra note 3.
14. Id.
15. See id.
16. Id.; see also FrederickBanting, supra note 12.
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Banting, Best, and Collip acquired an American patent on insulin and
its method of creation on January 23, 1923.17 When applying for their
patent, the trio maintained that "their goal was not profit, but ensuring the
8
speedy and safe availability of their discovery to the public."" They then
sold their patent rights to the Board of Governors of the University of
Toronto for $1.00 each.1 9 In a letter to the University's president, the trio
wrote, "The patent would not be used for any other purpose than to prevent
the taking out of a patent by other persons. When the details of the method
of preparation are published anyone would be free to prepare the extract,
but no one could secure a profitablemonopoly."20 Banting, Best, and Collip
stated a clear goal: their lifesaving invention was to remain available to all.
That goal has failed.
This Comment analyzes how federal regulation of insulin prices will
correct failed market forces, leading to a stabilized market for the
indispensable medication. Part I of this Comment will provide a brief
overview of the current state of the insulin market in the United States. Part
II of this Comment will explain economics-based justifications for adopting
federal legislation to regulate the insulin market. It will also provide an
overview of the types of regulatory schemes that the government could
utilize in this market. Part III of this Comment will describe and critique
legislation that two states-Nevada and Colorado-have already acted to
regulate the cost of insulin and will then examine currently proposed federal
legislation that aims to lower insulin prices. Lastly, Part IV of this
Comment offers a solution: the addition of language to the proposed federal
legislation, incentivizing competition and positively affecting market prices
through the nationalization of patents.

17. Louis Rosenfeld, Insulin: Discovery and Controversy, 48 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY
2270, 2280 (2002),_https://perma.cc/GVR2-5E8Y.
18. Jeremy A. Greene & Kevin R. Riggs, Why Is There No Generic Insulin? Historical
Origins of a Modern Problem, 372 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1171, (Mar. 19, 2015),
https://perma.cc/L76A-E9VQ.
19. Rosenfeld, supra note 17.
20. MICHAEL BLISS, THE DISCOVERY OF INSULIN 133 (The Univ. of Chi. 25th
anniversary ed. 2007) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
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I. THE STATE OF THE INSULIN MARKET IN THE UNITED STATES TODAY
A. Economic Impact ofRising Insulin Prices
From 2002 to 2013, the cost of insulin nearly tripled. 21 Then, from
2012 to 2016, the cost of insulin rose dramatically again, nearly doubling. 22
In the first month of 2019 alone, insulin manufacturers Sanofi and Novo
Nordisk raised some of their insulin product prices as much as 4.9% and
5.2%, respectively. 23
As of 2017, diabetes treatment and complications cost the United
States ("U.S.") more than $327 billion per year, making it the most
expensive chronic illness in the country.24 This cost is a combination of
$237 billion in direct medical costs, including $15 billion for insulin, and
$90 billion in indirect costs. 25 The American Diabetes Association reports:
While much of the cost of diabetes appears to fall on insurers (especially
Medicare) and employers (in the form of reduced productivity at work,
missed work days, and higher employer expenditures for health care), in
reality such costs are passed along to all of society in the form of higher
insurance premiums and taxes, reduced earnings, and reduced standard of
living.26
Government insurance, including Medicare, Medicaid, and insurance
through the military, provide for a majority (67.3%) of the cost of diabetes
care in this country.27 Private insurance pays for 30.7%, and the uninsured

21. Ken Alltucker, Struggling to Stay Alive: Rising Insulin Prices Cause Diabetics to

Go to Extremes, USA TODAY (Mar. 27, 2019), https://perma.cc/ZHZ3-N6YA.
22. Id.; see also Robin Respaut & Chad Terhune, U.S. Insulin Costs PerPatientNearly
Doubled from 2012 to 2016: Study, THOMSON REUTERS (Jan. 22, 2019),
https://perma.cc/2JY7-KU3R.
23. Respaut & Terhune, supra note 22.
24. Press Release, Working Group, American Diabetes Association® Releases White
Paper by Insulin Access and Affordability Working Group at Hearing of Senate Special
Committee on Aging (May 8, 2018), https://perma.cc/3SXZ-AF62 (footnote omitted).
25. Am. Diabetes Ass'n, Economic Costs ofDiabetes in the U.S. in 2017, 41 DIABETES
CARE 917, 924 (2018). The American Diabetes Association reports:
Indirect costs include increased absenteeism ($3.3 billion) and reduced
productivity while at work ($26.9 billion) for the employed population, reduced
productivity for those not in the labor force ($2.3 billion), inability to work because
of disease-related disability ($37.5 billion), and lost productivity due to 277,000
premature deaths attributed to diabetes ($19.9 billion).
Id. at 917.
26. Id. at 927.
27. The Cost ofDiabetes, AM. DIABETES ASS'N, https://perma.cc/9PL6-S2UK.
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pay for 2% of the cost of diabetes care. 28 Uninsured diabetics visit the
doctor 60% less and receive 52% fewer prescriptions than insured diabetics,
yet uninsured diabetics account for 168% more emergency department
visits than insured diabetics.2 9 Accordingly, because of both the direct and
indirect costs of diabetes care, it is not just diabetics who are paying-all of
30
society shoulders the financial burden of the increasing cost of diabetes.
B. Social Impact ofRising Insulin Prices
Rising insulin prices induce "negative health and financial burdens on
the population." 3 1

Of the 30 million diabetic Americans, approximately 7.4 million
require daily doses of insulin to survive.32 Rising insulin prices have forced
some to cut back on or skip doses of insulin. 3 Others elect to forgo other
necessities such as food or rent in order to afford insulin. 3 A 2018 study
found that almost 26% of diabetics in the U.S. had rationed their insulin the
previous year.35 Recently, poignant stories have emerged detailing the
tragic societal consequences of these negative health and financial burdens,
including deaths due to an inability to afford insulin. 6
One such story is that of Alec Smith, a twenty-six-year-old who died
less than a month after his mother's health insurance plan removed him as
a beneficiary.3 7 Smith, who worked a full-time job and earned more than
minimum wage, could afford neither new insurance nor the monthly $1,000
28. Id.
29. Id. ("This estimate highlights the substantial burden that diabetes imposes on
society.").
30. Id.
31. See NEV. Div. OF PUB. & BEHAVIORAL HEALTH, NEv. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
SERVS., DRUG TRANSPARENCY REPORT 2019 ESSENTIAL DIABETES DRUGS 19 (May 31, 2019),
https://perma.cc/77ZG-TCZV.
32. Press Release, Am. Diabetes Ass'n, American Diabetes Association® Applauds
Colorado Governor and State Legislature for Passing HB 1216: Reduce Insulin Prices Bill
(May 22, 2019), https://perma.cc/KCL7-UK5J. These numbers account for adults with
diagnosed diabetes, including both type 1 and type 2 diabetes-it does not include children
or adults diagnosed with gestational diabetes. Am. Diabetes Ass'n, supra note 25, at 2.
33. Press Release, Am. Diabetes Ass'n, supra note 32.
34. See id.
35. TlInternational Releases Report on Rationing and Cost Survey Data,
Rationing insulin is a
TIlNTERNATIONAL (June 18, 2019), https://perma.cc/72W6-7JT8.
dangerous practice that can be fatal if the person is not taking enough insulin to adequately
regulate his or her blood sugar. See id.
36. See, e.g., Ritu Prasad, The Human Cost ofinsulin in America, BBC NEWS (Mar. 14,
2019), https://perma.cc/CZ63-RYTS.
37. Id.
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out-of-pocket cost of his insulin. 38 Another story is that of Meaghan Carter,
a forty-seven-year-old woman who died alone on her sofa on Christmas
night because she could not afford insulin.3 9 Carter, a nurse, was between
jobs.4 0 She planned to start a new nursing position with health insurance
benefits only a week after her death.4 1 Carter's family found empty vials of
insulin among Carter's nursing supplies in her home.42 According to
Carter's sister-in-law Mindi Patterson, "[s]he had gauze, bandages and all
her nursing supplies"-"plenty to take care of others but not enough to take
care of herself." 4 3 The stories of Alec Smith and Meaghan Carter
demonstrate that there is more than just money at stake here-people's lives
are on the line because of insulin prices in the U.S.
Almost a hundred years after the discovery of insulin, diabetics should
not be forced to ration an essential drug or face death due to excessive costs.
Banting, Best, and Collip's goal was to make insulin affordable for all," but
that is not the case today. The current price of insulin in the U.S. is
unacceptable and must be addressed.
II. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT SHOULD REGULATE THE INSULIN
MARKET BECAUSE OF THE FAILURE OF TYPICAL MARKET FORCES
A. Economics-BasedJustifications
Effective federal regulation will alleviate at least two causes of high
insulin prices: patents preventing competition from manufacturers of
"generic" insulins, and the failure of normal market forces due to the lack
of competition.4 5 U.S. patent law provides patent-holders with twenty years
of patent exclusivity for the development of new drugs.46 Exclusivity

38. Id.
39. Alltucker, supra note 21.

40. Id.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id.
Id.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
See BLISS, supra note 20.
See Callum Borchers, Why Insulin Defies the Normal Rules Of Economics And

Keeps Getting More Expensive, WBUR: THE PRICE OF HEALTH (June 25, 2019),

https://perma.cc/DX2N-EEP2.
46. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2018).
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permits patent-holders to set prices and control the market for at least twenty
years.4 7
Currently, there are three primary pharmaceutical companies
manufacturing insulin in the U.S. market: Eli Lilly, Novo Nordisk, and
Sanofi. 4 8 These three pharmaceutical companies "minimize competition by
patenting incremental changes" to their insulin formulas, making it
extremely difficult for other manufacturers to develop affordable, effective
generics known as biosimilars. 49 For example, even though Sanofi's
primary patents for the insulin Lantus expired in 2015, Sanofi has filed
around seventy patents for incremental changes since 2000.s0 These
secondary patents will allow Sanofi to receive patent protection over the
formula for Lantus through at least March 2028.
Thus, the three pharmaceutical companies that manufacture insulin
have developed what is essentially a monopoly over the insulin market
52
through this patent-based barrier to potential competitors. Because it is so
difficult for other manufacturers to create biosimilar insulins due to patents,
there is currently very little room for competition from other drug
manufacturers." In fact, Eli Lily and Sanofi produce the only two
biosimilar insulins currently on the market, meaning these manufacturers
can maintain the monopoly. 54
In a typical market, product price usually falls as time goes on.
Common causes of a decrease in market value include competitors entering
the market and introducing similar, cheaper alternatives, or a current
manufacturer making an advancement that lowers the value of older

47. Tahir Amin, Patent Abuse is Driving up Drug Prices. Just look at Lantus, STAT

(Dec. 7, 2018), https://perma.cc/W3Y5-J8S5.
48. Daniel Kowalski, Why We Don't Have Generic Insulin, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC.
(Mar. 16, 2019), https://perma.cc/DG7G-Y9G5 ("[Research and development has] kept the
patents for insulin in the hands of three big companies-Sanofi, Novo Nordisk, and Eli
Lilly-because the original 1922 insulin patent included patent rights on any manufacturing
improvements."); see also Borchers, supranote 45.
49. Borchers, supra note 45; see also Amin, supra note 47.
50. See Amin, supra note 47.
51. SANOFI, ANNUAL REPORT FORM 20-F 2018, at 62 (Dec. 31, 2018),
https://perma.cc/2WVR-F927.
52. See Irena Asmundson, Supply and Demand: Why Markets Tick, INT'L MONETARY
FUND, https://perma.cc/8GCR-P4N5.
53. See Kowalski, supra note 48. Eli Lilly now produces the biosimilar Basaglar, which
is comparable to Lantus and has a 15% lower list price. Id. Sanofi produces the biosimilar
Admelog, which is comparable to Humalog and also has a 15% lower list price. Id.
54. See id.
55. Borchers, supra note 45.
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versions of a product.5 6 Consumers can choose to either purchase a cheaper
alternative or upgrade to the newer, more advanced product-either choice
would lower demand for the original product, thus lowering the market
value of the older version.5 7
Insulin is not a typical consumer product." Not only do patents
prevent competitors from entering the market, but type 1 diabetics cannot
exert pressure on the pharmaceutical companies to lower prices by simply
choosing to not purchase insulin.59 Instead, "[tlype 1 diabetics without
adequate insurance coverage are vulnerable to price increases because they
can't live without the drug . . . . 'People have to buy insulin no matter what
the cost is . .. [giving] a lot of strength to the people selling insulin."' 0
When the marketplace is unable to self-regulate a monopoly through
competition, the traditional solution is the passage of regulation rather than
leaving the monopoly free within "the unregulated marketplace or to the
antitrust laws for correction." 61 When determining the most appropriate
type of regulation, there are several options available, the most viable of
which are discussed below. 6 2
B. Regulations Available to Increase Competition
This Section describes five regulatory approaches that the government
could potentially utilize in lowering insulin prices: disclosure regulation,
cost-of-service ratemaking, historically based price regulation, price cap
regulation, and nationalization.

56. Id.
57. See id. ("The price of a product usually falls over time. That's often because
competitors offer alternatives, or new advances make past breakthroughs less valuable.");
see also M.E. Cravens, Who Sets the Price?, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (July 1, 1958),
https://perma.cc/43JS-6H3Q ("The customer is free to select what he, or she, considers the
best buy from the many choices available.").
58. See Borchers, supranote 45.
5 9. Id.
60. Alltucker, supra note 21 (statement of Simeon Taylor). Simeon Taylor is a
Professor of Medicine and diabetes research at the University of Maryland School of
Medicine, as well as a former employee of both Eli Lilly and the National Institutes of Health
Inter-Institute Training Program in Endocrinology. See generally, Simeon I. Taylor, MD,
PhD, UNIV. MD. SCH. MED., https://perma.cc/Z4Z3-L5VK.
61. STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 191 (1982).

62. See infra Part II.B.1-5.
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1. DisclosureRegulation
Disclosure regulations require sellers or manufacturers to provide
certain information to consumers.63 For example, the Food and Drug
Administration requires drug manufacturers to disclose information about
64
side effects and active ingredients in prescription drug advertisements.
Another example is Nevada's recently-implemented drug transparency law,
which is a type of disclosure regulation. 65 The economic aim of disclosure
regulation is to provide consumers with the ability to make informed
choices and facilitate comparison between products by providing enough
information for consumers to make a meaningful choice.66 However,
disclosure of information is effective only when consumers understand the
information, are free to make purchasing choices on the basis of that
information, and when the information disclosed is "materially relevant to
the choice." 67 The insulin market, however, lacks competition due to patent
protection and the necessity of insulin for diabetics, which prevents
68
Thus, disclosure in a
consumers from having any meaningful choice.
monopoly-controlled market would be an ineffective regulation because it
would have "little practical effect on choice."6 9
2. Cost-of-Service Ratemaking
Another option to regulate a monopoly, which would likely be more
70
This type of
effective than disclosure, is cost-of-service ratemaking.
costs and
production
regulation lowers prices by equating them with
eliminating some of the profit that manufacturers earn from holding a
monopoly." Ideally, a cost-of-service ratemaking regulatory system would
keep prices near the cost of production, offer incentives to the
manufacturers for production efficiency, and provide the consumers with
"some guarantee of fair dealing."72
Downsides of cost-of-service ratemaking regulation include an
incentive to under-invest in increasing production efficiency or increasing
technological innovations in order to maximize profits under the regulatory
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See BREYER, supra note 61, at 161.
21 C.F.R. § 202.1 (2019).
See NEv. REV. STAT. § § 439B.635, .645, .650 (2019); infra Part II.A.
See BREYER, supra note 61, at 162.
Id. at 164.

68.

Borchers, supra note 45.
BREYER, supra note 61, at 164.

69.

70. Id. at 191.
71. Id.
72. BREYER, supra note 61, at 285.
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scheme.7 3 Indeed, until the issues of patent protections and lack of
competition in the insulin market are addressed, cost-of-service ratemaking
regulation would do little to incentivize insulin manufacturers to invest in
efficiency or technology.74 Until competitors are able to enter the market,
manufacturers can remain unconcerned with losing customers to more
efficient or more technologically-advanced competitors.7 5
3. HistoricallyBased Price Regulation
A practical alternative to cost-of-service ratemaking regulation is
historically based price regulation.76 This type of regulation sets current
industry prices by allowing each firm to charge a previous price for a
product that the government deems acceptable.77 Administratively, it is an
attractive type of regulation because "(1) historical prices are usually
ascertainable, (2) producers can determine cost increases fairly readily, (3)
the same rule can apply to all indust[ries], and (4) the rules are
understandable and to some extent self-enforceable." 78
So far, governments have infrequently and temporarily implemented
historically based price regulation systems.7 9 Indeed, the longer a
government utilizes this type of regulation, the less advantageous it
becomes.so
Downsides to historically based price regulation are

73. See Jorry M. Mwenechanya, Approaches to Economic Regulation, NAT'L Ass'N
REG. UTIL. COMMISSIONERS (April 2011), https://perma.cc/87N4-SC73.

74. See generally Borchers, supra note 45 ("[P]atent laws allow the few dominant
insulin makers to minimize competition by patenting incremental changes to their products,
which makes it hard for cheaper generics to enter the market."); Kowalski, supra note 48
("Innovation costs a lot of money on the research and development end because it is

expensive to develop and test new drugs.").
75. See Borchers, supra note 45; Kowalski, supra note 48 ("Manufacturing insulin is

different from other drug manufacturing because you are biologically replicating a human
hormone rather than creating a chemical medicine that interacts with the body. The costs of
purchasing the equipment necessary to enter this market are prohibitively expensive.").
76. BREYER, supra note 61, at 60.

77. Id.
78. Id. at 62. Historical prices may be unascertainable when products are custom-made

for purchasers, such as purchasers of steel who require individual specifications, or sellers
that have contracts with purchasers for future delivery that provide for price increases. Id.
at 60-61.
79. Id. at 61. For example, historically based price regulations have previously been
used in wartime, such as the General Maximum Price Regulation during World War II or the

General Ceiling Price Regulation during the Korean War. Id. at 60. In these cases, regulators
had to make exceptions to fit circumstances such as seasonal products or sales. Id.
80. See id. at 62. In prior instances of historically based price regulations, producers
learned to fit their products into exemptions, and shortages of products increased when
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unavoidable and tend to worsen over time.81 The same problems that appear
in cost-of-service ratemaking will plague a historically based price system,
including a lack of incentive for investment in efficiency or technological
advancement.82
4. Price Cap Regulation
Another alternative regulatory system is price cap regulation.8 3 Price
cap regulation most commonly appears in the telecommunications and
utilities industries.84 Colorado recently adopted this type of regulatory
scheme through its "Reduce Insulin Prices" law that caps out-of-pocket
insulin costs for patients at $100 per month.8
Typically, price cap regulation is a temporary measure that aims to
subject manufacturers to market pressures by promoting competition,
thereby incentivizing producers to increase efficiency, reduce costs, and
invest in technological innovations." Like with disclosure regulation, price
cap regulation can only increase competition if there are competitors in the
market, and competitors are lacking in the insulin market due to patent
protections.8 7

5. Nationalization
An additional option, and likely the most controversial type of insulinprice regulation, is nationalization." Nationalization occurs when the

producers switched to exempted products. For example, producers would sell apple jelly
with sugar but would not sell sugar alone to avoid price freezes. Id. at 61.
81. Id. at 62-63.
82. See id. at 64-70. In addition, historically based price regulation can foster shortages
because producers "hesitate to make new investment, discontinue unprofitable product lines,
or even go out of business." Id. at 66.
83. See generally Mark A. Jamison, Regulation: Price Cap and Revenue Cap, in 3
ENCYCLOPEDIA ENERGY ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY 1245 (Barney L. Capehart ed.,

2007).
84. See generally Ian Alexander & Timothy Irwin, Note, Price Caps, Rate-of-Return
Regulation, and the Cost of Capital, PUBLIC POLICY FOR THE PRIVATE SECTOR, Sept. 1996.
GEN. ASSEMBLY,
19-1216: Bill Summary,
CoLo.
85. Colorado H.B.

https://perma.cc/TJF3-V9Z4.
86. See Mwenechanya, supra note 73. When a manufacturer is subject to a cap on the
price it can charge consumers for its goods or services, the manufacturer has an incentive to
increase productivity and efficiency to maximize profits. See FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N,
REPORT No. CC 97-22, CoMMIssioN REFORMS ITS PRICE CAP PLAN (1997).

87. See id.; see also Borchers, supra note 45.
88. BREYER, supra note 61, at 191.
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government takes over ownership and control of a private industry.89 For
example, in the U.S., the federal government has nationalized private
industries in the form of "bailouts," such as the bailout of AIG in 2008 and
General Motors Company in 2009.90
However, nationalization is generally unpopular in the U.S. due to
concerns that the resulting firm would be overly susceptible to political
pressures and partisan interests. 91
Notwithstanding these concerns,
nationalization has been an accepted practice in the U.S. in the face of
industries that "cause widespread suffering and populist anger." 92 Once
more people realize the economic and social impact of today's high insulin
prices, 93 the insulin market may be an ideal candidate for nationalization to
allow competitors to access the insulin formula patents and decrease insulin

prices.94
In reality, an optimal regulatory solution for a complex industry such
as the insulin market, which has many moving parts, 9 5 may require a
89. Justin Pritchard, What Does It Mean to NationalizeBanks and Industries?,BALANCE
(June 15, 2019), https://perma.cc/6TBH-ADMN).
90. Will Kenton, Nationalization,INVESTOPEDIA, https://perma.cc/XVQ8-TZRU.
91. BREYER, supra note 61, at 191. People often associate nationalization with the
implementation of communist or socialist government systems, such as those in Russia in
1918, Iran in 1951, and Cuba in 1960.
Mary Shepard Spaeth, Nationalization,
ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA, https://perma.cc/5CGB-Y85K.
Additionally, people who
view a free enterprise system as an economic ideal can find nationalization troubling,
especially if the government makes profit by taking over a private business. See Thomas J.
Donahue, Can the Government Nationalize a Business?, U.S. CHAMBER COM. (Feb. 26,
2018), https://perma.cc/2R43-JK4H.
92. Pritchard, supra note 89.
93. See supra Part I.
94. BREYER, supra note 61, at 181-83. The government has previously found success
in nationalizing industries during wartime, such as nationalizing railroads and coal mines
during World War II. See A History of CorporateNationalization, CBS NEws (June 2,
2009), https://perma.cc/R7WA-M7QA. More recently, during the mortgage crisis that began
in 2007, the U.S. government nationalized the nation's largest banks that were deemed "too
big to fail" because they created excessive risk for both the U.S. and global marketplace.
Pritchard, supra note 89. Arguably, the healthcare industry is ripe for nationalization
because of a growing awareness amongst the population of "abuse, a lack of transparency,
and great suffering." Id.
95. Diana DeGette & Tom Reed, Insulin: A Lifesaving Drug Too Often Out ofReach,
CONG. DIABETES CAUCUS 7-11, https://perma.cc/YZ4K-N3E8. The insulin supply chain
essentially involves two pathways, each of which implicates multiple entities. Id. at 7. The
first pathway is from the insulin manufacturer to the pharmacy, and the second pathway is
from the pharmacy to the patient/consumer. Id. In the first pathway, manufacturers set a list
price for insulin, which forms the starting point for negotiations between the manufacturer,
wholesalers, and pharmacy benefit managers. Id. Manufacturers give rebates, or discounts,
to wholesalers that offer competitive shipping contracts. Id. Wholesalers then sell the
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combination of types of regulation.96 For example, a combination of
historically based price regulation and nationalization of insulin-formula
patents would likely promote competition and address the failure of market
forces in the insulin market.9 7
III. DESCRIPTION AND CRITIQUE OF CURRENTLY ENACTED STATE
LEGISLATION AND CURRENTLY PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION AIMED
AT REDUCING INSULIN PRICES

States have begun responding to the high insulin costs affecting many
patients by proposing and enacting legislation." This Section analyzes the
approaches taken by Nevada and Colorado, which were the first states to
enact insulin price regulation. In addition, several pieces of legislation
99
aimed at regulating the insulin market are awaiting action in Congress.
insulin to pharmacies for a profit. Id. In the second pathway, insured patients purchase
insulin from a pharmacy and typically pay for out-of-pocket expenses such as a co-payment
or a co-insurance payment. Id. at 8. The pharmacy then collects the remainder of the listprice from the patient's pharmacy benefit manager, which likely negotiated rebates with
manufacturers in exchange for preferential placement of specific insulins on the insurer's list
of formulary drugs. Id. at 8-9. Uninsured patients, on the other hand, pay the full list-price
for the insulin. Id. at 9.
96. See, e.g., Wendell Pritchett, Types of Regulation, REG. REv. (Apr. 5, 2016),
https://perma.cc/F4KN-6RK7 (explaining effective regulation of a complex industry, such
as higher education, may require a "mixture of approaches").
97. See infra Part IV.
98. States that have proposed insulin price legislation include Florida, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See
Christopher Brown, Capping Patients' Insulin Costs on Agenda in Several States,
BLOOMBERG L. (Dec. 20, 2019), https://perma.cc/5UZM-YSH8; Jackson Danbeck,
Virginia'sHouse PassesBill to Limit Insulin Copay to $30for Month Supply, NBC15 (Feb.
4, 2020), https://perma.cc/6YSS-KDF5. States that have passed insulin price legislation
include Colorado, Nevada, and Illinois. See NEv. REV. STAT. § 439B.635 (2019); HBl91216 Bill Summary, supra note 85; Jackson Danbeck, Illinois Governor Signs Law Capping
Insulin Costs at $100 Per Month, NBCI5 (Jan. 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/5C2Q-WYVV.
99. Besides the Insulin Price Reduction Act, currently proposed legislation aimed at
reducing insulin prices includes the Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act, which Senator
Elizabeth Warren introduced on December 18, 2018. Affordable Drug Manufacturing Act
of 2018, S.3775, 115th Cong. (2018). This bill proposes the establishment of an Office of
Drug Manufacturing within the Department of Health and Human Services to manufacture
affordable prescription drugs, including insulin. Id. Currently proposed legislation also
includes the Affordable Insulin Act, which Representative Peter Welch introduced on
February 28, 2019. Affordable Insulin Act of 2019, H.R.1478, 116th Cong. (2019). This
bill proposes an amendment to the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to allow wholesale
distributors, pharmacies, and individuals to import affordable, safe insulin from select
countries. Id.
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This Section will also examine one piece of proposed legislation-the
Insulin Price Reduction Act'"-and analyze the type of regulation it
advances and the likely efficacy of that type of regulation in the insulin
market.
A. Enacted State LegislationAimed at Lowering Insulin Prices
In 2017, Nevada adopted Senate Bill 539, otherwise known as the
Insulin Price Transparency Act.10 1 More recently, in 2019, Colorado
adopted House Bill 19-1216, which has been referred to as an insulin price
cap. 10 2 The contents, current effects, and potential shortcomings of both
laws are discussed below. 103
1. Nevada's Response to Rising Insulin Prices
On June 15, 2017, Nevada implemented a disclosure system of
regulation by enacting a price transparency law. 1 The purpose of this law
is "to provide transparency to consumers regarding significant diabetes drug
price increases, the justifications for those price increases, and attempt to
modify the method by which we spend money on prescription drugs."'
Lawmakers hope that the transparency resulting from the law will allow
both legislatures and patients to push for drug pricing reform in the insulin
market, but the law itself does not affect prices.' 06
Nevada's price transparency law includes provisions requiring
manufacturers of essential diabetes drugs to report data to the state
regarding production costs, profit, and marketing costs of the drugs, as well
as what rebates the manufacturers provide to pharmacy benefit managers.1 07
100. Insulin Price Reduction Act, S. 2199, 116th Cong. (2019).
101. Lydia Ramsey, Nevada Just Passed One ofthe Strictest DrugPricingTransparency
Laws in the Country, Bus. INSIDER (June 15, 2017), https://perma.cc/TNL7-LDRM.
102. Allison Bailey & Erin Gilmer, Colorado'sInsulinPrice Cap:A Foundationto Build
Upon, TlINTERNATIONAL (July 9, 2019), https://perma.cc/Z8LH-TLBH.

103. See infra Part HI.A.1-2.
104. SB539 Overview, NEV. ELECTRONIC LEGIS. INFO. Sys., https://perma.cc/3DW7-

6JXD.
105. Drug TransparencyNevada, NEV. DEP'T HEALTH & Hum. SERVICES (Sept. 2018),
https://perma.cc/BK7F-SVJ7.
106. See Megan Messerly, First Diabetes Drug Transparency Report Reveals Profits,
Costs Associated with Treating the Disease, NEV. INDEP. (Mar. 13, 2019),
https://thenevadaindependent.com/article/first-diabetes-drug-transparency-report-reveals-

profits-costs-associated-with-treating-the-disease.
107. NEV. REV. STAT. § 439B.635 (2019); Ramsey, supra note 101. A pharmacy benefit
manager is "an entity that contracts with or is employed by a third party and manages the
pharmacy benefits plan or prescription drug coverage provided by a third party." NEV. DEP'T
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The law also requires pharmacy benefit managers to disclose information
about the rebates they negotiate with manufacturers, along with the rebates
that the pharmacy benefit managers retain for themselves. 08
Once the manufacturers and pharmacy benefit manufacturers have
submitted their reports to the Nevada Department of Health and Human
Services ("the Department"), the law requires the Department to "analyze
the information ... and compile a report on the price of the [essential
diabetes drugs], the reasons for any increases in those prices and the effect
of those prices on overall spending on prescription drugs in this State."' 0 9
The Department's 2019 Drug Transparency Report found that there was a
significant price increase, during the previous year or two, of 22.4% of
essential diabetes drugs."o Of those essential diabetes drugs, insulin had
the second-highest significant price increase."' The average one-year
increase in price for essential diabetes drugs was 6.4%, while the average
two-year increase in price was 21.7%.1 12
According to the Department's report, the one-year increase far
exceeded the annual 2017 or 2018 Consumer Price Index, Medical Care
Component, "which were 2.5% and 2.0% respectively."l 3 The Report
concluded that "[p]rice increase percentages greater than these published
[Consumer Price Index] values during each one-year period cannot be
justified alone as maintaining pace with general medical inflation."" 4 The
Report also found that "[t]he most frequent justifications for price increases
in order of prevalence were research and development investments (26%),
the drug has more competitive value (12%), changes in marketplace
dynamics (11%), rebates provided to [pharmacy benefit managers],
insurers, and others (11%), and investment in manufacturing (8%).""1
As of October 2, 2019, Nevada imposed $17.4 million in fines on
twenty-one companies for failure to comply or late compliance with the

OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.,

SB539

DRUG TRANSPARENCY FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS,

at 9 (FAQs) (Aug. 10, 2018).
108. NEV. REV. STAT. § 439B.645; Ramsey, supra note 101.
109. NEV. REV. STAT. § 439B.650.
110. SCOTT JONES ET AL., NEV. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN
DRUGS
DIABETES
2019
ESSENTIAL
REPORT:
TRANSPARENCY
https://perma.cc/N4PZ-8PHT.
1 11. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 10.
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reporting requirements under the law."' The Department informed the
companies of the requirement to either pay the fines in full within thirty
days or request an informal dispute resolution meeting within ten days. 117
Failure to respond would result in a case referral to the attorney general's
office to collect the fines through a court order.1 1
Transparency regulations, like Nevada's, are meant to inform patients
and consumers about insulin prices, but the laws on their own "are unlikely
to substantially reduce insulin prices in the [United States]."ll9 Instead,
these laws are designed to enable future reforms using the data.' 20 It is
admirable that states like Nevada are seeking to increase insulin price
transparency; however, while it may eventually lead to pricing reforms in
the future,121 it is not enough. Lowering insulin costs for patients who are
struggling to survive will require more aggressive legislation aimed at
decreasing out-of-pocket costs of insulin.
2. Colorado'sResponse to Rising Insulin Prices
Unlike Nevada, Colorado enacted a law aimed at capping insulin
prices.12 House Bill 19-1216 became effective on January 1, 2020.123 The
Act caps out-of-pocket insulin costs at $100 for a one-month prescription
supply. 124 In addition, "[t]he bill requires the department of law to
investigate the pricing of prescription insulin drugs and submit a report of
its findings to the governor, the commissioner of insurance, and the
judiciary committees of the senate and house of representatives."1 25
Colorado's approach raises the concern that it will result in increased
insurance premiums because insurance companies will have to absorb the

116. Megan Messerly, Nevada Levies $17 Million in Fines on Drug Companies for
Noncompliance with Diabetes Drug Transparency Law, NEV. INDEP. (Oct. 2, 2019),
https://perma.cc/AT3C-7USP.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Jing Luo et. al., Strategies to Improve the Affordability of Insulin in the USA, 5
LANCET DIABETES & ENDOCRiNOLOGY 159 (Mar. 1, 2017), https://perma.cc/HQG8XXZ3?type=image.
120. Id.
121. See NEV. REV. STAT. § 439B.650 (2019); S.F. 366, 91st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn.
2019).
122. Colorado H.B. 19-1216 Bill Summary, supra note 85.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
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costs of the insulin list price beyond the $100 price cap.126 However,
insurance companies' justifications for the 2020 insurance rates either did
not mention the insulin price cap as a factor in their calculations or referred
to the influence of the insulin price cap as "negligible" and "de minimus
[sic]."l27 Indeed, so far, insurance rates for Colorado residents have not
increased as a result of the law.1 28
Another concern about Colorado's price cap regulation is that it does
not cap the price of insulin for all diabetics; rather, it caps the price only for
individuals with private health insurance. 129 This means that individuals
without insurance, or individuals covered by government programs like
Medicare or employer self-funded "ERISA plans," will not benefit from the
price cap. 3 0
Additionally, Colorado legislators are already planning to respond to a
"loophole" in the law.' 3 ' While the law is meant to cap total out-of-pocket
monthly expenses on insulin at $100, the law currently limits what patients
pay to $100 per prescription, so patients could still pay $200 or $300 per
32
month if they require two or three types of insulin.'
B. ProposedFederalLegislation Aimed at Lowering Insulin Prices
On July 22, 2019, Senator Jeanne Shaheen introduced the Insulin Price
Reduction Act, which is co-sponsored by Senators Collins, Carper, and
Cramer.1 33 Senators Shaheen and Carper are Democrats, and Senators
34
Collins and Cramer are Republicans, making this a bipartisan bill.1

.

126. John Ingold, Critics Worried Colorado's New Law Capping Insulin Costs Would
Raise Insurance Rates. It Hasn 't, COLO. SUN (Sept. 11, 2019), https://perna.cc/4VYNMY7G.
127. Id.
128. See Meg Wingerter, Lawmaker Looks to Close "Loophole" in Colorado'sFirst-InThe-Nation Insulin Price Cap, DENVER POST (Jan. 10, 2020), https://perma.cc/HP2D-NX4C
("So far, insurance plans in Colorado haven't substantially increased rates in response to the
insulin price cap . .
129. Id.
130. See id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Insulin Price Reduction Act, S. 2199, 116th Cong. (2019); Todd Boudreaux, Senate
Bill Aims to Cut Price of Insulin by 75%, BEYOND TYPE 1 (July 22, 2019),
https://perma.cc/U3BJ-VEGR.
134. Boudreaux, supra note 133.
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1. Overview of the Insulin Price Reduction Act
The Insulin Price Reduction Act, a form of historically based price
regulation, targets rebates from insulin manufacturers to pharmacy benefit
managers and insurersl 35 by restricting the use of rebatesl 36 for insulin if the
manufacturer voluntarily reduces the list price to no higher than its 2006 list
In addition, the Insulin Price Reduction Act would bar the
price.13
pharmacy benefit manager or insurer from excluding such an insulin from
formulary lists or otherwise adding barriers to patients' access to that
insulin.13 8 To continue to qualify for the restrictions, the manufacturer
could not increase the list price of that insulin by more than the medical
inflation increase 3 9 for that year. 14 0 If the law passes, patients could expect
a 75% price decrease from the otherwise expected prices of popular insulin
brands for 2020.141
2. PotentialDownsides of the Insulin PriceReduction Act
The Insulin Price Reduction Act has not yet been passed in the Senate,
let alone passed in the House and sent to the President for signing. 14 2
However, it is possible to speculate on the types of issues that could arise
from historically based price regulation.143
Because the Insulin Price Reduction Act was recently introduced, it
still has to make it through committees, Senate debates," and other
obstacles. One such obstacle could be competing legislative measures, such
135. The rebate restrictions applied to both private insurers and Medicare Part D. Id.
136. See Degette & Reed, supra note 95.
137. Craig Idlebrook, The Senate's Insulin PriceReduction Act: What You Need to Know,
TID EXCHANGE GLU (July 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/7RRS-QTFJ. Limiting the cost to no
more than the price for the same product in 2006 appears to be a type of historically pricebased regulation. See id.
138. Id.
139. Medical inflation "refers to medical trends and developments, and the increase in
cost to support them. This often includes the cost of advances in treatments and procedures,
and the increased availability and usage of them around the world." The Mystery Behind
MedicalInflation, AXA (Aug. 27,2018), https://perma.cc/JAL5-Y5JR. The Consumer Price
Index measures and reports this rate of inflation annually. Measuring Price Change in the
CPI: Medical Care, U.S. BUREAU LAB. STATS. (Apr. 24, 2019), https://perma.cc/9NMWNCUV.
140. Idlebrook, supra note 137.
141. Boudreaux, supra note 133.
142. See Insulin Price Reduction Act, S. 2199, 116th Cong. (2019).
143. See BREYER, supra note 61, at 60-70.
144. See How Laws Are Made and How to Research Them, USAGov,
https://perma.cc/R8P5-DKA3 (last updated Aug. 27, 2019).
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'

as other drug pricing laws that have recently been introduced.' 45 Another
obstacle may be partisan measures as the 2020 election approaches and
politicians need to garner support from their electorates, even though the
Insulin Price Reduction Act is a bipartisan bill. 4 6
If the Insulin Price Reduction Act is signed into law, the law will face
the shortcomings attendant to historically based price regulation systems.1 47
For example, the Act may end up only a temporary solution as drug
manufacturers find loopholes, stop investing in efficiency or technological
advancements, and decrease production of popular insulin brands. 4 8
Additionally, historically based price regulation systems are typically
utilized in industries with "large numbers of firms with disparate costs." 49
In the insulin manufacturing market, there are only three major firms-Eli
Lilly, Novo Nordisk, and Sanofi'o-and their costs are not disparate.' 5
Without competitors in the market, these three manufacturers have little
financial incentive to keep costs down once the historically based price
regulation is lifted or once the manufacturers find loopholes or exemptions
in the system.' 52 Accordingly, because the Insulin Price Reduction Act fails
to address insulin manufacturers' monopolistic power, the law is missing a
crucial element to allow natural market forces to function-competition.
IV. PROPOSED SOLUTION

While the Insulin Price Reduction Act seeks to address the current high
prices of insulin as a historically based price regulation, it is likely a
temporary solution.' 53 Until competitors can enter the market and exert
downward pressure on the three large insulin manufacturers to reduce

145. See Idlebrook, supra note 137. One such competing bill seeks to cap drug prices for
Medicare recipients, which has gained more publicity and has been featured in more news
stories than the Insulin Price Reduction Act. Id.
146. Id.
147. See BREYER, supra note 61, at 60-70.
148. See id.
149. Id. at 60.
150. William T. Cefalu et. al., Insulin Access and Affordability Working Group:
Conclusions and Recommendations, 41 DIABETES CARE 1299, 1300 (June 2018),
https://perma.cc/7U6G-JGYN.
151. For example, "when one insulin manufacturer increases the price for a given insulin
formulation, the other insulin manufacturers often increase their prices by a similar amount
shortly thereafter." Id. at 1301.
152. See, e.g., Borchers, supra note 45.
153. See BREYER, supra note 61, at 61 ("[A] pure historical price freeze has never been
imposed for long.").
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prices, the monopolistic power of those manufacturers will persist. 5 4 To
resolve this issue, this Comment proposes that Congress pass a law that
contains the provisions already written in the Insulin Price Reduction Act
plus a provision directing the government (through a department such as the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services) to nationalize insulin
formula patents and allow competitors to enter the market.
A. Source of the Government's Power to Seize Control ofPatents
Congress has provided the United States government with the power
of nationalization to use and manufacture patented items."' The statute, 28
U.S.C. section 1498(a), provides:
Whenever an invention described in and covered by a patent of the United
States is used or manufactured by or for the United States . . . [the patent

holder can sue the United States in the Court of Federal Claims for a remedy
of] reasonable and entire compensation for such use and manufacture.156
Because section 1498(a) provides a remedy to patent-holders for the
government's use or manufacture of patented items, the statute necessarily
presupposes that the government can use or manufacture patented items in
the first place. 5 1 Indeed, section 1498(a) has been referred to as "eminent
domain for patents." 5 1 Under section 1498(a), "patent holders can demand
royalties but cannot stop the government from producing the medicine or
allowing [generic manufacturers] to produce or import the medicine.""
B. Historical Uses of28 U.S.C. Section 1498(a)
The government has previously enforced section 1498(a) in at least
two areas: military supplies and pharmaceuticals.1 60 In the past, the
government has mostly utilized section 1498(a) in the military context, such
154. See, e.g., Competition Counts: How Consumers Win When Businesses Compete,
FED. TRADE COMMISSION, https://perma.cc/83XS-DK2J.

155. See 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) (2018); see also Amy Kapczynski & Aaron S. Kesselheim,
'Government Patent Use': A Legal Approach To Reducing Drug Spending, 35 HEALTH AFF.
791 (2016) (discussing the potential use of section 1498(a) in the context of direct-acting
antiviral drugs for the treatment of hepatitis C).
156. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).
157. See Scott A. Felder, FederalCircuit Reinforces Broad Reach of 28 U.S. C. § 1498,
WILEY REIN LLP (Sept. 21, 2015), https://perma.cc/YA7P-A5W5.
158. Natalie Shure, Force Drug Companies to Lower Prices, AM. PROSPECT (Sept. 26,
2019),
https://perma.cc/6K2L-PGQR (internal quotation marks omitted).
159. Kapczynski & Kesselheim, supra note 155, at 792.
160. See Shure, supra note 158.
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16
as procuring night-vision goggles and lead-free bullets. 1 In the
pharmaceutical context, the government has sought to use section 1498(a)
at least once,162 laying precedent that it can be used in the insulin market.
For example, the threat of anthrax as a chemical weapon in 2001 prompted
the government to attempt to stockpile ciprofloxacin (Cipro), an antibiotic
used to treat exposure to anthrax.' 63 The manufacturer of Cipro, Bayer,
resisted producing more Cipro and refused to lower prices for the
government.1 6 4 in response, the health and human services secretary
threatened to import generic versions of Cipro under section 1498.165 Bayer
relented, guaranteeing both an adequate supply of Cipro and a 50% discount
in the drug's price.1 66 Because the government has previously brandished
section 1498 in the pharmaceutical context, it follows that the government
could choose to use section 1498 to correct the current insulin market.

C. Combining 28 U.S.C. Section 1498(a) With the Insulin Price Reduction
Act
If the Insulin Price Reduction Act were to include a provision directing
a department, such as the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
to use insulin formula patents, many of the shortcomings of a historically
based price regulation system could be curtailed.
Historically based price regulation systems must usually be temporary
measures to avoid shortages.' 67 The 2006 pricing regulation provision of
the Insulin Price Production Act could similarly be a temporary measure
until competitors enter the market through the use of insulin formula
patents.1 68 Once competitors have entered the market, the 2006 pricing
regulation could be lifted. Normal competitive market forces could keep
insulin prices reasonable without the 2006 pricing regulation, and
consumers would have the power to choose an effective, affordable product
69
from whichever competitor they prefer, as in a typical product market.'

161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Kapczynski & Kesselheirn, supra note 155, at 794.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

167.

See BREYER, supra note 61, at 60.

168. See generally Kowalski, supra note 48.
169. See, e.g., Kowalski, supra note 48; see also Mwenechanya, supra note 73; Borchers,
supra note 45.
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D. ProbableObjections to the Use of 28 U.S.C. Section 1498(a)
As with any individual facing a governmental exercise of eminent
domain over his or her property, insulin manufacturers would probably
object to the government's use of their closely-guarded patents.17 0 One
likely objection would be an argument that the nationalization of insulin
formula patents would interfere "with their incentives to invest in
innovation.""' However, this argument is likely without merit, as "such
incentives would remain robust if the government royalties [paid to the drug
manufacturers] were sufficient to compensate the companies for research
and development costs, adjusted for risk of failure and margins of error in
calculations made by a court or agency."l 72
CONCLUSION

The combination of historically based price regulation and
nationalization will allow typical market forces to resume in the insulin
market. Congress should amend and pass the Insulin Price Reduction Act 73
to reflect this Comment's suggestion to include nationalization of insulin
formula patents. As written, the Insulin Price Reduction Act is only a
partial, temporary solution-a band-aid-for a larger problem of failed
market forces. If amended and passed, the Insulin Price Reduction Act will
reduce insulin prices both immediately through historically based price
regulation and long-term by fostering competition-the foundation of a
successful market economy. 174
Erin M. Barker*

170. See, e.g., Mwenechanya, supra note 73; see also Borchers, supra note 45.
171. Kapczynski & Kesselheim, supra note 155, at 795.
172. Id.
173. Insulin Price Reduction Act, S. 2199, 116th Cong. (2019).
174. See, e.g., J.H. Cullum Clark, Why America's Free Market Economy Works Better in
Some Placesthan Others, GEORGE W. BUSH INST. (2019), https://perma.cc/B3M3-PPRH.
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